The development of the welfare state in the Western economies between 1930 and 1990 coincided with a puzzling pattern in the taxation of top incomes. E¤ective tax rates at the top increased sharply but then gradually decreased, even as social transfers continued rising. We propose a new theory of the development of the welfare state to explain these facts. Our main insight is that social insurance and top income taxation are substitutes for averting social con ‡ict. We emphasize the role of the Great Depression as a source of aggregate risk, and argue that the rise of the welfare state can be understood as a process of exploiting e¢ ciency gains in response to gradual technological improvements in the provision of social insurance. Our detailed arguments build on the policy histories of the United States, Great Britain, and Sweden.
Introduction
Social transfers grew spectacularly in the Western economies between 1930 and 1990 . Meanwhile, tax rates on the top 1 percent of the income distribution increased sharply in the 1930s and 1940s but then decreased gradually between 1960 and 1990 . This pattern of top income taxation is particularly striking in the United States and the United Kingdom, but it is qualitatively similar in other countries.
1 Why was there so little change in social transfers until the Great Depression? If the state taxes the wealthy to supply transfers to others, why did top income taxes decline after 1960?
We propose a new theory of the development of the welfare state to address these questions. A risk neutral elite, or governing group, is presumed to have control over policy, but it requires the cooperation of a risk averse non-governing group in order to be able to produce.
The interests of the governing group are aligned with the economic interests of the top of the income distribution. 2 We characterize public policy as the outcome of Pareto e¢ cient equilibria of a repeated game where in every period the governing group designs income transfers and the non-governing group makes a participation choice. The threat of con ‡ict -non-participation in production -enables the non-governing group to obtain a part of the surplus from cooperation. Since the non-governing group is exposed to risks that private insurance markets fail to cover, the governing group has an incentive to provide redistribution in the form of state-contingent transfers, i.e., social insurance. This allows them to secure social peace with smaller average transfers compared to providing pure redistribution.
Our main insight is that insurance and top income taxation are substitutes for averting social con ‡ict. This can explain the pattern of top income taxes and social transfers. Future incomes were perceived as riskier in the aftermath of the Great Depression, making social con ‡ict more attractive. As social insurance coverage was initially inadequate for counteracting risk, an increase in redistribution …nanced by top income taxes was required to avoid con ‡ict. We argue that constraints in revenue collection, record-keeping, and program ad-ministration necessitated, historically, an incremental approach to social insurance coverage.
Consequently, the increase in top income taxation was reversed gradually as social insurance programs matured to provide better coverage, and con ‡ict was made increasingly less attractive.
Through the lens of our theory, the expansion of the welfare state can be understood as a process of exploitation of e¢ ciency gains made possible by learning-by-doing and technical improvements in public administration. This mechanism could not have operated before the taxation innovations resulting from World War II, nor after the 1980s, at which time all major social insurance programs were in place, and public administration records were fully computerized in the Western economies. Our view complements other explanations of the development of the welfare state, which are discussed in Section 1.
In the 1951 annual report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Arthur Burns (1951: 3) described the unprecedented decline in the top income shares between 1930 and 1950 as "a transformation that has been carried out peacefully and gradually, but which may already be counted as one of the great social revolutions of history." 3 From our perspective, it is precisely the supply of social insurance by power elites who are not the main bene…ciaries of the programs, and the increased taxation of the top incomes, that underlaid this peaceful transformation in the distribution of national income.
It is commonly argued that the increase in top income taxes in the period 1930-1950 was a key factor preventing the top income shares from recovering after World War II, and also that the tax cuts after the 1960s precipitated the increases in the income shares of the very top of the distribution in several countries after 1980. 4 These arguments, however, take as given the evolution of taxation, without addressing its causes. Our view is that the period of declining top tax rates was the concomitant of a more e¢ cient supply of social insurance.
In the rest of the paper, we develop the mapping between our formal theory and the history of welfare policy in the United States, Britain, and Sweden. In Section 2 we document the facts that motivate our theory, and we discuss the related literature. In Section 3 we 3 Cited in Lindert (1998) . 4 See, e.g., Kuznets (1963) , Piketty and Saez (2003) , Saez (2004) , and Atkinson and Leigh (2010) . present our basic model of social policy. In Section 4 we extend it to formalize the e¤ects of changes in aggregate risk and in insurance opportunities. In Section 5 we discuss, for each country, the history of social insurance and tax legislation in relation to the threat of con ‡ict and to the role of elites in the development of the welfare state. Section 6 concludes.
Technical proofs are in the Appendix.
Stylized facts and related literature
The expansion of social insurance coverage in the Western economies is re ‡ected in the growth of government transfers to individuals. Figure 1 depicts the remarkable growth of social transfers between 1930 and 1990 . Social transfers as a share of GDP in 1930 were only 0.6, 2.2 and 2.6 percent in the US, Britain and Sweden, respectively. By 1990 these shares were 13. 4, 19.5, and 30.8. 5 Over this period, about three-quarters of transfers every year are in the form of social insurance payments.
[ Figure 1 ]
Meanwhile, tax progressivity increased sharply in the 1930s and 1940s but then decreased gradually between 1960 and 1990. This pattern is re ‡ected in the e¤ective tax rates at the top of the income distribution, measured as the di¤erence between the pre-tax income share and the post-tax income share, as a proportion of the pre-tax income share. Table I .2) for 1900 -1930 OECD Social Expenditure Database (1960 -1981 ) and (1980 . A break in the series makes the post-1980 series not directly comparable to the pre-1980 series. 6 We calculated the e¤ective tax rates using data on pre-tax and post-tax income shares for the U.S., from Kuznets (1953) for the period 1930-1946 and from Piketty and Saez (2007) for the period 1960-2000; for the U.K., from Atkinson (2007) for the period 1937 and for Sweden, from Statistics Sweden (2008) for the period 1975-2000. The data sources are not fully comparable. Kuznets (1953) refers only to income taxation. The post-tax income shares in Piketty and Saez (2007) are net of personal, corporate and estate taxes, and payroll taxes. The shares in the UK and Sweden are net of personal income taxes and social security contributions only. and Saez, 2007) and Britain for the period 1937-2000 (Atkinson, 2007) indicates that the sharp increase in tax progressivity at the top after 1930 and the subsequent gradual decline that is apparent in Figure 2 is most evident for the upper fractiles of the top 1 percent.
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Data on post-tax income shares for the top 1 percent in Sweden is available to us only after 1975. However, United Nations data reported in Kuznets (1963) indicates that e¤ective tax rates for the top 5 percent in Sweden increased from 8.9 to 15 percent between 1935 and 1948.
Conventional theories of the welfare state stress the demand for redistribution from rich to poor as a function of the political strength of the working class. The process of democratization is one such force that may lead to an increase in demands for redistribution. However, while Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that earlier redistributive spending is likely to have been associated with the rise of democracy, the achievement of near universal su¤rage before 1930 makes it di¢ cult to understand how the rise of democracy by itself could be the main source of the rise in transfers after 1930 (Lindert, 2004 : ch. 7, Aidt et al., 2006 .
A related hypothesis is that the burden of the Great Depression and World War II fell disproportionately on the bottom half of the income distribution, and worsening inequality led subsequently to larger demands for redistribution, in the spirit of Meltzer and Richard (1981) .
8 However, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. In particular, the growth in social transfers coincided with reduced pre-tax income inequality.
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More generally, shifts in the political power of the working class could have a¤ected tax progression and the size of transfers (Korpi, 1980, Korpi and Palme, 2003) . However, this
would not explain why the evolution of social transfers did not just mimic the pattern of top income taxes. It also fails to recognize that the power of the working class may itself be a¤ected by aggregate risk. For instance, Rodrik (1998) provides evidence that countries 7 The consensus is that the pattern of top income shares does not merely re ‡ect patterns of tax avoidance and evasion, but rather changes in real incomes. See Atkinson (2004) and the references in footnote 4. 8 The period of high tax progressivity cannot be attributed to the cost of World War II alone. For instance, top statutory tax rates remained high into the 1960s whereas, in contrast, after World War I the top tax rates fell in each country within …ve years after the war. 9 For instance, the Gini coe¢ cient in the United States was stable at 0. 35-0.36 between 1955 and 1980 (U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables) ; in the United Kingdom it fell from 0.41 in 1949 to 0.37 in 1975 (Lowe, 1999) ; and in Sweden it fell from 0.38 in 1951 to 0.32 in 1973 (Bjorklund and Palme, 2000) . that are exposed to more risk spend more on social transfers.
The literature on the welfare state stresses the e¢ ciency losses from redistributive policies.
However, the slowdown of the welfare state in the 1990s is hard to understand solely in terms of the limits to social demands for redistribution. In particular, the view that the welfare state was simply unsustainable after 1980, because of the distortionary e¤ects of taxes and transfers, is not well supported by the evidence (Atkinson, 1995 , Lindert, 2004 .
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Whereas the dominant approach for understanding the welfare state stresses redistribution as the essence of social policy, a second approach identi…es the provision of insurance as primary. In our view, combining both approaches improves our understanding of the welfare state. It is apparent not only that many transfer programs were designed speci…cally to provide insurance, but also that they tend to be redistributive across individuals ex ante (Barr, 2004) . Whether redistribution or insurance is viewed as central matters for assessing the consequences of the welfare state, which may be driven by e¢ ciency losses from redistributive policies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994) , or by e¢ ciency gains from protecting individuals against otherwise uninsurable risks (Benabou, 2000) . In this paper, we argue that it was the gradual exploitation of e¢ ciency gains from social insurance that drove the development of the modern welfare state, and that this process re ‡ected the substitutability between top income taxation and insurance for averting social con ‡ict.
A model of social policy
We formalize social policy as a self-enforcing contract in a repeated game between two groups, denoted A and B. Each group has a continuum of agents with identical mass normalized to 1. We assume that all agents within a group are identical, and they have resolved all freeriding problems so they act as a group. Group A is the governing group. By this we mean that it has the power to choose per capita transfers T t to the non-governing group (group B) every period t 1. We use the word transfer to denote generically any net income ‡ows (positive or negative) from the governing group toward the non-governing group. From the 10 See also Benabou (1996) , and Romer and Romer, 2012) perspective of the latter, a positive transfer is a subsidy and a negative transfer is a tax. It shall become clear that our arguments extend to the case of N 1 non-governing groups.
The governing group's power is limited by the fact that the non-governing group chooses whether to participate in the social contract or to opt out. Opting out of the social contract is meant to formalize the consequences of social con ‡ict in a simple manner. The important feature is that con ‡ict is an ine¢ cient outcome. If group B chooses not to participate in the social contract in period t, we assume that y Instead, if the non-governing group participates in the social contract, we assume that the pre-transfer per capita incomes of each group participating in the social contract are exogenous random variables, independent over time and across groups. Speci…cally, the pre-transfer income of each individual in group A in period t, y t A > 0, is drawn from some distribution F A (y t A ) with positive support, whereas the pre-transfer income for each individual in group B is a weighted sum of J > 1 risky components y t j > 0, for j = 1; :::; J. For simplicity, we assume that they have a common distribution F y t j , with positive support. An important assumption is that the governing group can make the transfers T t conditional on the realizations of y t A and on the realizations of a subset K f1; :::; Jg of the risky components y t j . Each factor j 2 K can thus be described as insurable, while each factor j = 2 K is uninsurable. Formally, the pre-transfer income y t B of each agent in group B is
where a j > 0 are constant weights, and y t j is independent across risks and time periods. We refer to the transfer schedule T t (y A ; fy j g j2K ) as the social contract in period t, where T t is a function of the realizations fy A ; fy j g j2K g of the random variables y t A ; fy t j g j2K . For simplicity, we assume that agents in the non-governing group can never be made to pay an amount greater than their insurable income, that is,
Thus, each factor j 2 K is both insurable and taxable, while each factor j = 2 K is both uninsurable and non-taxable. This may be interpreted as re ‡ecting the fact that only the realizations of the insurable/taxable risk factors are veri…able.
Individuals in the non-governing group are risk averse, with per-period utility
with 2 (0; 1), whenever they participate in the social contract. Since we have normalized con ‡ict payo¤s to zero, we restrict the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (1 ) to be less than unity so there can be gains from trade. We also assume that agents in the governing group are risk neutral, which is a good approximation when the members of the governing group are su¢ ciently rich, or they have access to insurance markets, or they can self-insure.
The stage game
The timing of the stage game is as follows. Before the realization fy A ; fy j g j2K ; fy j g j = 2K g of the shocks y 
2K
is observed at date t, group A chooses a social contract T t (y A ; fy j g j2K ), and simultaneously group B chooses whether to participate in the social contract or to opt out, where x t = 1 if group B participates at date t and x t = 0 if group B opts out. Then, if x t = 0, the social contract breaks down, and all individuals receive a zero payo¤. Instead, if x t = 1, actual transfers take place according to T t (y A ; fy j g j2K ), and individuals in groups A and B enjoy (ex post) payo¤s y A T t and u (y B + T t ), respectively.
For concreteness it may be useful to think of the governing group as o¤ering a take-it-orleave-it social contract every period, even though our analysis abstracts from the details of the institutional setting.
The set of feasible individually rational (ex ante) payo¤s in the stage game is given by
and
for group A and group B, respectively, at any date t, where E is the expectation operator.
If the stage game is played just once, the unique Nash equilibrium, denoted by (x N E ; T N E ),
is such that the non-governing group participates in the social contract and the governing group appropriates all insurable/taxable incomes:
Group B does not opt out of the social contract, even though individuals anticipate that their insurable/taxable incomes will be expropriated, because their noninsurable/nontaxable income is positive whereas the con ‡ict payo¤s have been normalized to zero.
Our main results below would remain unchanged under alternative assumptions leading to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game where group B opts out of the social contract.
Furthermore, our assumption that group A has all the bargaining power in the stage game serves to highlight the implications of social cooperation when the groups interact repeatedly, but it is otherwise inessential. What is important is that (1) group A can in ‡uence social transfers and thus the distribution of the social surplus in the insurable/taxable states and (2) the threat of ine¢ cient con ‡ict endows group B with some de facto bargaining power, the degree of which is endogenous to the equilibrium of the repeated game.
The repeated game
We shall focus on e¢ cient perfect equilibria in pure strategies of the in…nitely repeated game. To …x terminology, note that an action pro…le at date t, denoted by (x t ; T t ), consists of a participation choice and a social contract. A history of the game at date t, denoted
, is the sequence of action pro…les and realizations of the shocks y A ; fy j g j2K ; fy j g j = 2K , denoted by Y , prior to date t. The game starts at date 0 with the null history h 0 . A pure strategy pro…le ( A ; B ) is a sequence of
for i = A; B, mapping possible period-t histories to non-mixed actions.
A stream of action pro…les, denoted by Q = f(x t ; T t )g t 0 , is referred to as a path, and denotes the set of feasible paths. A strategy pro…le generates a path that can be de…ned inductively in the obvious manner. Preferences over paths for each individual in group A and B are determined according to the normalized utility functions
respectively, where the discount factor < 1 is common to all individuals. The normalization factor (1 ) implies that the normalized value of 1 util per period is 1, so payo¤s in the stage game and in the repeated game are measured in the same units.
A pure strategy pro…le ( A ; B ) is a (subgame) perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if, for every history h t , the restriction of ( A ; B ) to the histories consistent with h t is a Nash equilibrium of the game from period t on with history h t . A path Q is Pareto e¢ cient if
, for i = A; B, for all paths Q 0 2 . A perfect equilibrium with the property that it implements a Pareto e¢ cient path is referred to as an e¢ cient perfect equilibrium.
E¢ cient perfect equilibria
In this section we characterize the properties of e¢ cient perfect equilibria. We begin by characterizing the set of Pareto e¢ cient paths, and then we show how they can be implemented by subgame perfect equilibria.
The set of Pareto e¢ cient paths can be characterized by maximizing group A's utility over all paths subject to group B's utility being no lower than a given value v, for each feasible value v:
where V B , U A (Q) and U B (Q) are given by equations (5), (7) and (8), respectively. The following result is easy to verify.
Proposition 1 A path Q = f(x t ; T t )g t 0 with U B (Q) = v is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if it is a stationary path such that every period the non-governing group participates (x t = 1 for all t 0) and the social contract provides full insurance against insurable shocks by specifying the stationary transfer schedule T t = T e for all t 0, where
and c is a constant satisfying
Proposition 1 implies that any feasible individually rational payo¤s in the stage game can be generated by a Pareto e¢ cient path. Note that receiving the payo¤ v every period amounts to a normalized sum of discounted utilities U B (Q) equal to v.
To gain some intuition, note that a solution to the problem given by (9), with x t = 1 for all t, satis…es
for all insurable/taxable income realizations fy A ; fy j g j2K g, and for all t 0, where is the Lagrange multiplier for group B's participation constraint, and u 0 denotes marginal utility.
That is, at any date t 0, group A trades o¤, state by state, the marginal bene…t from taking (or giving) additional income from (or to) group B and the marginal cost of doing so, which in turn depends on the value that group B places on additional income in a given
state. An optimal trade-o¤ involves e¢ cient risk sharing, in the sense that it is optimal for group A to provide full insurance to group B against ‡uctuations in the insurable component of their pre-transfer incomes.
11 11 An e¢ cient social contract speci…es a schedule of transfers that is independent of the realization y A , To see why Pareto e¢ cient paths must be stationary, note that the above e¢ ciency condition has implications for consumption smoothing across time periods. Intuitively, e¢ cient consumption smoothing re ‡ects the equality of the two groups'marginal rates of substitution between current and next-period's consumption, that is,
which implies that T t+1 = T t for all t, since incomes are i.i.d., all individuals have the same discount factor, and individuals in group B have a strictly decreasing marginal utility.
The next proposition shows that any interior Pareto e¢ cient path can be implemented by a subgame perfect equilibrium if individuals are su¢ ciently patient. It also characterizes e¢ cient perfect equilibria in terms of strategy pro…les that are simple in the sense of Abreu (1988) . Formally, a simple strategy pro…le (Q 0 ; Q A ; Q B ) is a rule that speci…es: (i) play Q 0 until some group deviates singly from Q 0 ; (ii) for i = A; B, play Q i if group i deviates singly from Q j , for j = 0; A; B, where Q j is an ongoing previously speci…ed path; continue with Q j if no deviations occur or if both groups deviate simultaneously.
Simple strategy pro…les are history-independent in the sense that they specify the same punishment Q i for any deviation by player i after any previous history. Also note that group A chooses transfers for every realization of the insurable/taxable components of income. Thus, a deviation by group A is a deviation from the contract that applies to all insurable/taxable income realizations, where we have assumed that all deviations from the equilibrium play are observable.
Abreu's analysis applies here, and it implies that (Q 0 ; Q A ; Q B ) is perfect if and only if no one-shot deviation by any group i = A; B from Q j , j = 0; A; B, is pro…table, given that both groups will conform with Q i after the deviation. It also implies that a path Q 0 is the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium ( A ; B ) if and only if it is the outcome of some perfect simple strategy pro…le .
Proposition 2 constructs perfect simple strategy pro…les that can implement any given interior Pareto e¢ cient path, provided that individuals are su¢ ciently patient. Interior paths because group A's members are risk neutral.
are paths where each group's payo¤s are strictly individually rational every period. Since
Pareto e¢ cient paths are stationary, they are interior if and only if
Proposition 2 For any interior Pareto e¢ cient path Q e = f(1; T e )g t 0 , there is a discount factor < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; 1) there is a perfect simple strategy pro…le (Q e ; Q A ; Q B ) that implements Q e , where any unilateral deviation by group A (from any ongoing path) triggers a switch to the path Q A involving 2 (0; 1) periods of con ‡ict followed by a return to the equilibrium path and any unilateral deviation by group B (from any ongoing path) triggers a switch to the path Q B in which the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is played permanently.
Formally, the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix shows that (Q e ; Q A ; Q B ) can implement Q e by specifying the paths (punishments):
where T e is given by Proposition 1 and T N E is given by equation (6). Not surprisingly, subgame perfection requires the punishment Q A to take the form of a stick-and-carrot punishment, where the earlier stages of the punishment are more unpleasant than the remainder.
In particular, note that the group B's threat of opting out of the social contract forever (i.e., = 1) would not be a credible threat.
Proposition 2 characterizes a particular structure of behavior underlying social contracts that provide e¢ cient risk sharing. Such a structure may be interpreted in terms of a social norm involving a credible threat of con ‡ict by the non-governing group that serves to constrain the power of the governing group to in ‡uence the distribution of the social surplus through social policy. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 together imply that how the surplus is actually distributed is a function of the equilibrium. Thus, di¤erent equilibria can be interpreted as di¤ering in terms of the (endogenous) bargaining power of the two groups.
While the source of such a bargaining power is left unexplained, it is natural to view it as the result of the underlying institutional environment.
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Moreover, any (interior) e¢ cient perfect equilibrium implements the social contract that solves the following static problem every period:
Conversely, any solution to the above problem can be implemented by an e¢ cient perfect equilibrium, if individuals are su¢ ciently patient. In this context, one can interpret as a rule that speci…es equilibrium social demands. Group A demands that group B participates in the social contract, while the latter demands social policy (i.e., a social contract). One can also think of social demands by group B every period in terms of utility (v) rather than transfers (T ). Group A can then be viewed as the residual claimant to the social surplus every period after meeting group B's "utility demands". It is therefore in the self-interest of group A to design policies that meet utility demands in the least costly manner. This entails meeting the participation constraint of group B by providing insurance, in the form of state-contingent transfers, rather than pure redistribution.
Top income taxation and social insurance
In this section we extend our basic model of social policy in order to formalize how the Great Depression, and how the proliferation of social insurance programs, may have each in ‡uenced the taxation of top incomes. To that end, …rst note that Proposition 1 implies that the expected tax rate paid by the governing group in the basic model is simply
where the equality follows from the fact that T e and y A are independent random variables.
The taxes paid by group A are the transfers received by group B. Group A will be a net payer for all income realizations if group B's utility demands (v) are high enough. We want to analyze how the expected tax rate E (T e =y t A ) responds …rst to changes in aggregate risk and second to changes in insurance opportunities.
The level of the expected tax E (T e ) is a function of the distribution of the insurable income components fy t A ; fy t j g j2K g only through E P j2K a j y t j , but it is a more complicated function of the distribution of the uninsurable components fy t j g j =
2K . An increase in aggregate risk can be understood in terms of a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the sum of uninsurable risks P j = 2K a j y t j . Since we have assumed that all risky components are independent and identically distributed we can formalize an increase in aggregate risk as a mean-preserving spread in the common distribution F y t j . Since the increase in uninsurable risk does not a¤ect the distribution of the governing group's pre-tax income, all we need to know is its e¤ect on the expected tax E (T e ).
13 The increased riskiness of the insurable components of risk has no e¤ect on the expected transfers, because the governing group is risk neutral. Now consider changes in insurance opportunities. We have introduced multiple risks to capture a notion of di¤erent public insurance programs, each targeting a speci…c risk. Thus, we interpret the social contract T e as relying on a single social insurance program for each insurable risk j 2 K, and thus, we can view the number of social insurance programs as being identical to the number of insurable risks j 2 K. From this perspective, one can formalize the e¤ect of introducing additional social insurance programs as an expansion in the subset of insurable risks from K to K 0 , with K K 0 . The expansion of insurance programs does not change the governing-group's pre-transfer income distribution, and so, once again, all we need to know is its e¤ect on the expected tax E (T e ).
Simply considering the e¤ect of exogenous changes in F or K in the context of the above stationary environment is somewhat problematic. For a given equilibrium, the unexpected change would have no impact on behavior, and moreover, the original social contract T e would 13 Alternatively, note that if the increase in aggregate risk were to be accompanied by a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of y t A , the e¤ect on the expected tax rate through E (1=y t A ) directly would be positive, since 1=y t A is a convex function of y t A . As we will show, this e¤ect would reinforce the e¤ect of a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of aggregate uninsurable risk on the expected tax rate. no longer be e¢ cient after the change in the environment. If the original equilibrium does change in response to unexpected changes in the environment, the multiplicity of equilibria in the repeated game implies that equilibrium responses are arbitrary. We address this problem next, by treating the distribution of uninsurable risks and the set of insurable risks at time t, denoted by F t and K t , respectively, as state variables that evolve over time.
Changes in aggregate risk and in insurance programs
The new assumption is that now the distribution of uninsurable risks F t and the subset of insurable risks K t evolve as follows. In period 0 the state is given by (F 0 ; K 0 ). In subsequent periods there is a constant probability " > 0 every period that the distribution of uninsurable incomes will change from F 0 to F 1 and will remain F 1 forever after, where F 1 is a meanpreserving spread of F 0 . In turn, once the state (F 1 ; K 0 ) is reached, there is a constant probability > 0 every period that the subset of insurable incomes will change from K 0 to K 1 , with K 0 K 1 , and will remain K 1 forever after. Accordingly, (
is an absorbing state. Thus, one needs to consider only two (stochastic) transitions: one from (F 0 ; K 0 ) to (F 1 ; K 0 ) and a second one from (F 1 ; K 0 ) to (F 1 ; K 1 ). For simplicity, we assume that the distributions F 0 and F 1 have common support. We also assume that the state (F t ; K t ) is observed at the beginning of period t, before date-t actions are taken.
Our analysis of the basic model with a constant environment carries through with appropriate modi…cations, where one needs to account for the fact that histories of the game include the history of realizations of the exogenous state (
be a history of the game at date t. The game starts at date 0 with the null history b h 0 . A pure
Since histories are random, one must recognize the dependence of actions on the current Preferences over paths for each individual in group A and B are now given by
respectively, where E denotes the expectation with respect to income realizations conditional on the realized state (F t ; K t ) at date t, and E 0 denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution over future histories of the state.
The set of feasible individually rational payo¤s in the stage game depends on time only through the current realization of the state, and it is given by
for (F; K) 2 f(F 0 ; K 0 ) ; (F 1 ; K 0 ) ; (F 1 ; K 1 )g, for groups A and B, respectively, at any date t.
Proceeding as in Section 3.3, we now characterize interior e¢ cient perfect equilibria.
Proposition 3 describes the properties of interior Pareto e¢ cient paths, and Proposition 4 shows how they can be implemented by subgame perfect equilibria.
Proposition 3 An interior path
is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if it has the following properties:
(1) the non-governing group always participates (b x t = 1, for all (F; K), and for all t 0);
(2) the social contract provides full insurance against insurable shocks every period by specifying the state-dependent transfer schedule b T t = b T e for all t 0, where
and c (F 1 ; K 1 ) > 0 is a constant satisfying
(3) the social contract provides e¢ cient consumption smoothing across states, that is, c (F 0 ; K 0 ) > 0 and c (F 1 ; K 0 ) > 0 are two constants such that expected marginal utilities (conditional on the state) for the non-governing group are equated across states.
It is not di¢ cult to verify that the set of interior Pareto e¢ cient paths is non-empty if
the average income of the governing group, E (y t A ), is su¢ ciently large. As in Section 3.3, the set of Pareto e¢ cient paths can be characterized by maximizing group A's utility, b U A b Q , over all paths subject to group B's utility, b U B b Q , being no lower than a given value v, for each feasible value v. It is easy to verify that the solution to this problem is such that b x t (F; K) = 1, for all t and all (F; K), and it satis…es
for all fy A ; fy j g j2K g, for all (F; K), and for all t 0, where b is the Lagrange multiplier for group B's participation constraint.
Equation (20) has several important implications. It implies that every period the governing group provides full insurance to the non-governing group against ‡uctuations in the insurable component of their incomes. It also implies that e¢ cient social contracts depend on time only through the state (F; K). Accordingly,
Moreover, once the absorbing state (F 1 ; K 1 ) is reached, the analysis in Section 3 applies, and e¢ cient social contracts become stationary. Then, for any arbitrary e¢ cient contract in state (F 1 ; K 1 ), the social contracts in the other two feasible states (F 0 ; K 0 ) and (F 1 ; K 0 ) are also implied by equation (20), which requires that expected marginal utilities (conditional on the state) be equated across states:
This condition re ‡ects e¢ cient consumption smoothing across states as well as time.
Consequently, the characterization of e¢ cient paths in Proposition 3 is independent of the probability distribution of changes in (F t ; K t ), as given by the probabilities " and . 14 This re ‡ects the fact that the non-governing group is in e¤ect insured against the risk of changes in the state (F t ; K t ).
One can also construct perfect simple strategy pro…les that implement any given interior Pareto e¢ cient path, provided that individuals are su¢ ciently patient.
Proposition 4 For any interior Pareto e¢ cient path
, there is a discount factor < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; 1) there is a perfect simple strategy pro…le While the perfect strategy pro…le b described in Proposition 4 must specify actions (x t ; T t ) at any date t as a function of the state (F; K), as dictated by the functions b x e ; b T e , the structure of b parallels that of the perfect strategy pro…le characterized in Proposition 2 for the case of a constant state. Formally, b b
by specifying the two paths (punishments)
, for some 2 (0; 1) ;
where b x e ; b T e is given by Proposition 3, and
In the next section we discuss the implications of the above e¢ cient perfect equilibria.
Implications for top income taxation
In order to understand the implications of our analysis for top income taxation, it is useful to think of social demands by the non-governing group every period in terms of utility rather than transfers. To that end, consider an e¢ cient perfect equilibrium b b 
Behavior along the equilibrium path can be viewed as a situation where the non-governing
in period t, and the governing group supplies an optimal social contract that meets the non-governing group's participation constraint that period. Formally, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, together, imply that any interior e¢ cient perfect equilibrium generating payo¤s v A (F; K) and v B (F; K) in state (F; K)
implements the social contract that solves the following static problem every period, as a function of the realized state (F; K):
Conversely, any solution to problem (26), for (F; K) = (F 0 ; K 0 ) ; (F 1 ; K 0 ) ; (F 1 ; K 1 ), such that expected marginal utilities for the non-governing group are equated across states (i.e., such that equation (21) Even though the state (F; K) changes over time, the governing group can still be viewed as the residual claimant to the social surplus every period after meeting the utility demands of the non-governing group. It is therefore in the self-interest of the governing group to design policies that meet those utility demands every period in the least costly manner, which is with social insurance.
Proposition 5 highlights the role of aggregate risk, and the connection between social insurance and top income taxation, which we think sheds new light into the common tem- Both results stated in the proposition are driven by a common mechanism: social insurance and top income taxation are substitutes for meeting the non-governing group's utility demands along an e¢ cient (equilibrium) path, hence for avoiding social con ‡ict.
To see this, consider a given e¢ cient path, where initially group B enjoys a given payo¤ v B (F 0 ; K 0 ) every period. Now consider an arbitrary period t where aggregate risk increases, as described by the change from F 0 to F 1 , where F 1 is a mean-preserving spread of F 0 .
The response of the expected tax paid by group A depends on how the expected marginal utility of consumption for individuals in group B responds to the increase in aggregate risk.
Since marginal utility is convex (that is, u 000 > 0), such an increase tends to raise expected marginal utility in period t. In order to keep marginal utility constant, average transfers to group B must increase so as to increase their average consumption. This is the natural e¤ect of e¢ cient risk sharing, whereby group B in e¤ect demands a higher average consumption when individuals in the group experience larger levels of risk. Note that the e¤ect on the level of group B's expected utility is in general ambiguous. Now suppose that new insurance programs arrive at date t. If the social contract did not change, consumption smoothing would still be e¢ cient, but insurance would not. Accordingly, it is in the interest of the governing group to take advantage of the new insurance opportunities in order to reduce the risk faced by the non-governing group. In turn, the reduction in risk tends to lower expected marginal utility in period t; therefore group A can keep group B's expected marginal utility constant by lowering average transfers to group B so as to decrease their average consumption. Once again, there is a trade-o¤ between insurance and top income taxation, but in this case group A exploits the trade-o¤ to lower the average tax they need to pay to ensure that group B participates in the social contract.
Further remarks
It is not di¢ cult to extend our previous analysis to the case of multiple non-governing groups.
The nature of e¢ cient perfect equilibria would remain unchanged under the assumption that the governing group is able to condition transfers on group identity as well as on income realizations. Intuitively, the model could then capture the idea that social groups can hurt group A relatively more when they are able to coordinate their opting out decisions. Now the background where social demands arise is one in which the degree of social coordination among the non-governing groups and the ability of the governing group to prevent such coordination play a critical role in the allocation of the social surplus. From this perspective, more redistributive welfare states result when members of a society can overcome their coordination problems and agree to place larger social demands on the state. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that the threat of social unrest was historically larger in countries such as Sweden, but that social demands were. In turn, one would expect that the ability to coordinate social demands depends largely on political institutions, and that social coordination may be easier in more homogeneous countries.
When there are multiple non-governing groups, an implication of perfect e¢ cient equi-libria is that, whenever feasible, it is in the best interest of the governing group to design distinct group-speci…c transfer schedules, each restricting eligibility to individuals in groups facing common risks (i.e. the same pro…le of a j 's). At any given time, the governing group may not have enough instruments to achieve this outcome, which is a source of ine¢ ciency.
For instance, some transfers may be conditioned only on observable group characteristics, such as race, gender, union membership or old age, which can serve as proxies for socioeconomic groups of individuals with similar risk characteristics and/or social demands. Other transfers may be conditional on income alone, without respect for the di¤erences in the actual risk faced by di¤erent individuals. This too is a source of ine¢ ciency. The governing group becomes better o¤ as these constraints are lifted, because it can meet any given utility demands at a lower cost for itself.
The previous argument is interesting because it can explain why the growth of the welfare state has consisted of an enlargement of insurable events characterized by the increasing number and complexity of transfer programs as well as the narrowing target of each program.
Our model suggests a view of the growth of the welfare state as being driven by the lifting of technical constraints faced by the public administration.
Social policy in historical perspective
In this section, we argue that the political in ‡uence of the wealthy, the threat of social con ‡ict, and the targeting of heterogenous risks, all played major roles in the evolution of social policy over the 20th century. Our most detailed arguments are for the United States, but we also discuss the cases of Britain and Sweden.
United States
Despite four episodes of high unemployment in the United States from 1890 until just prior to the Great Depression, no American state had passed legislation for unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, or health insurance before 1929. One possible reason for the muted e¤ect of the 1890s depression on social insurance reform is that there was a lack of common interests among American workers in the late 19th century: in terms of our model, an absence of coordination among non-governing groups. In comparing the depression of the 1890s with the Great Depression of the 1930s, Rauchway (2008: 38) notes: "the 1890s fell during an age of globalization, ... so many of the country's workers had been immigrants, literally of another people. By the Great Depression, this was no longer true."Furthermore, the massive unemployment during the Great Depression cut across social classes and bankrupted many trade union pension plans (Weaver, 1983) . These observations suggest why social protest escalated during the Great Depression.
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The Social Security Act of 1935 marks the birth of the welfare state in the United States.
It provided federal bene…ts to retirees and grants to states for the unemployed, old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, vocational rehabilitation, maternal and child welfare, and public health work. 16 The New Deal programs were legislated as social insurance to combat economic insecurity, with an emphasis on the fact that "funds for the payment of insurance bene…ts should not come from the proceeds of general taxation." 17 However, they were accompanied by sharp rises in tax progressivity. 18 Our interpretation is that the need for redistribution as an accompaniment to social insurance to avert social con ‡ict was recognized at the time. Thus, while advocating the introduction of an inheritance tax, President Roosevelt stated in a message to Congress on Tax Revision on June 19, 1935:
"Social unrest and a deepening sense of unfairness are dangers to our national life which we must minimize by vigorous methods." He noted further that, "The movement toward progressive taxation of wealth and of income has accompanied the growing diversi…cation and interrelation of e¤ort which marks our industrial society."These comments point to the use of progressive taxation for securing industrial cooperation during the Great Depression. Domho¤ (1990 Domho¤ ( , 1996 discusses the identity of the power elite and the channels through (Lampman, 1984) .
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The total tax burden imposed by federal taxation has been approximately constant as a proportion of GDP from 1953 onwards, but the composition has changed substantially.
22
Social insurance contributions have risen steadily since 1950 while corporation income taxes have fallen by a similar magnitude beginning in 1953 (see Table 2 .3 in the Budget of the United States, 2005). Since payroll taxes are regressive and the corporation income tax is progressive, the replacement of corporate taxes with payroll taxes in federal receipts contributed to the decline in tax progressivity. Piketty and Saez (2007) experience [and] they will be in a much better position to do this job than they were to do the social security job back in 1936 when it …rst went into e¤ect." 23 Furthermore, advances in record-keeping technology, especially automated data processing that originated during 21 See Kollman (1996) for the major legislative changes in social security bene…ts and coverage by employment categories.
22 Throughout the post-WWII period until the mid-1970s, budget de…cits were modest, and debt-to-GDP ratios were declining, not just in the US, but across the industrial economies. In the US, federal spending as a share of GDP remained stable between 1953 and 1980, as the increase in social transfers was o¤set by a relative decline in other federal spending, most notably military expenditures.
23 Cited in Twight (1995) .
World War II, likely facilitated the extensions of social insurance programs in the United
States in the 1960s and the 1970s.
24
Great Britain
Social legislation was not prominent in local elections between 1885 and 1914 and voter turnout was low in the United Kingdom (Thane, 1984) . However, social unrest during this period is apparent in the strike waves occurring in 1889 and the years immediately following and especially in 1910 (Cronin, 1979) . Bristol and 100,000 demonstrated in Newcastle (Perry, 2000) .
Unrest in the inter-war period did not by itself produce signi…cant changes to programs, but it is part of the background for the comprehensive social insurance reforms proposed by the Beveridge Report in 1942 as a response to the experience of the Great Depression.
The Report identi…ed six classes of vulnerable populations: employees, the self-employed, housewives, others of working age but not gainfully employed, those below working age, and the retired above working age. Implementation of the Report included the Family Allowances Act 1945, the National Insurance Act 1946, and the National Health Service Act 1946.
The formation of British welfare policy was in ‡uenced by business elites partly through the primacy given to the Treasury department's concerns and through the requirement that senior civil servants be educated at either Oxford or Cambridge in order to be exposed to the priorities of Treasury. The alignment of Treasury's outlook with elite interests resides in the importance of London as a trade and …nancial centre and in Treasury's role as the coordinating department of the civil service since 1868 (Valocchi, 1989) . The cost of the Beveridge Committee's initial proposals in 1942 caused considerable concern in the Treasury, after which Beveridge "made some major concessions (and thereby partly jeopardised the Report's principles) in an attempt to cut costs" (Lowe, 1999: 135) . Treasury continued its campaign to reduce the role of taxation in …nancing pensions over the next two decades, regardless of the party in power, which gradually reduced the redistributive element of the postwar pension system (Bridgen, 2006: 18) .
The top marginal personal income tax rate in the U.K. rose from 50 percent in 1928 to 66 percent by 1931, and remained over 95 percent between 1941 and 1954 before falling in steps to 40 percent in 1988. Part of the reversal in tax progressivity occurred due to changes in the structure of taxation. Thus the share of total tax revenues raised from companies was halved between 1955 and 1964, and again between 1965 and 1974 , while social security contributions and indirect taxes increased to compensate for the revenue shortfalls (Lowe, 1999: 286) .
The introduction of the Pay-As-You-Earn method of payroll tax deductions in the U.K.
in 1944 was a signi…cant tax innovation, which enabled spending growth after World War II. Subsequently, programs were tailored to vulnerable groups and became means-tested: in 1975 there were 45 major means-tested bene…ts, with di¤ering assessment criteria (Lowe, 1999: 152 (Flora, 1983) . Like in the case of the United States, our interpretation is that the incrementalism apparent in the development of social insurance programs in the United Kingdom re ‡ects gradual e¢ ciency-enhancing adaptations of programs to target needs more …nely.
Sweden
Sweden was also a¤ected by the severe global depression in the 1890s, and the possibility of social insurance schemes was considered there too. The administrative governor of the Stockholm area established an investigation of unemployment insurance for Stockholm and other major cities in 1894, but "[T]he committee concluded that the topic was too new and that no de…nite recommendations could yet be made" (Heclo, 1974: 71) .
A compulsory old age pension system was introduced in 1913 and a means-tested local unemployment bene…ts program in 1914. These were rudimentary insurance programs with very low bene…ts (Lundberg and Åmark, 2001) . Together with progressive taxes on income, wealth, death, and corporations, the policies were a response of the ruling elite to workingclass discontent (Steinmo, 1993) . The elections in the 1920s were the …rst with the potential to reveal the political e¤ects of universal su¤rage achieved in 1921. 25 Yet, according to Heclo (1974: p. 290 ) the new voting rolls had no impact on social policy.
The origin of the modern welfare state in Sweden can be traced to an historic agreement between the Swedish Employers Federation (SAF) and the major trades union congress (LO) in May of 1936. Steinmo (1993: 88) argues that the postwar social policies of Sweden re ‡ected this historic compromise between the agenda setting power of "big business"interests and the power of labor unions to disrupt production. This event was prompted by heightened labor unrest in the Great Depression. Workdays lost because of labor stoppages decreased almost four-fold between the periods of 1931 -35 and 1936 -40 (Steinmo, 1993 . Regular semisecret meetings between leaders of the Social Democratic party and the SAF occurred beginning in the early 1950s. At these so-called Thursday club meetings, government and business elites 25 Near universal male su¤rage was granted in 1909 but the greatest extensions in the voting rolls happened after World War I (Heclo, 1974) . discussed economic policy issues. Later labour o¢ cials from LO were added to the meetings.
According to Steinmo (1993: 125) (Bjorklund et al., 1995) . Our interpretation of these events is that even the famously redistributive Swedish welfare state is primarily a social insurance arrangement, and that a decline in tax progressivity in Sweden ensued the expansion of social insurance.
Conclusions
The advice given to the Prince of Salina in The Leopard -Giuseppe di Lampedusa's famous portrayal of socio-political upheaval in nineteenth century Italy -is: "If we want things to the stay as they are, things will have to change." In the same spirit, we have argued that, in the United States, Britain and Sweden, the wealthy responded to the threat of unrest brought about by the Great Depression by bearing a remarkable increase in top income taxation in the period . But as new social insurance programs and extensions of existing programs targeted heterogeneous risks more …nely over time, less redistribution through the tax system was required to avert social unrest. By 1990, programs covered the major categories of risk faced by most households and transfers stabilized. Our main conclusion is that the development of the welfare state re ‡ected the gradual substitution of social insurance for top income taxation as an e¢ cient means of averting social con ‡ict.
We have abstracted from the roles commonly assigned to economic development and negative incentive e¤ects in explaining the sources and the limits of the welfare state. We have shut down these e¤ects in order to focus on the supply of social insurance and the role of economic risks. This re ‡ects an important contrast between our view and one that equates a larger welfare state with larger e¢ ciency losses. Instead, we see the growth in the number and complexity of transfer programs as re ‡ecting the exploitation of further e¢ ciency gains.
Our analysis has taken as given the pre-tax income distribution in order to focus on social policy. Conversely, analyses of the dynamics of the income distribution, particularly the top incomes, usually take social policy as given. We think that there are important insights to be gained from a better understanding of the joint evolution of the income distribution and social policy. It is straightforward to verify that, for each state (F; K), no one-shot deviation by any group i = A; B from b Q j , j = e; A; B, is pro…table, given that both groups will conform with b Q i after the deviation, if the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. For each state, the arguments parallel those used in the proof of Proposition 2. QED where the equality follows from Proposition 3, and the inequality follows from the facts that F 1 is a mean-preserving spread of F 0 , and u 0 is a strictly convex function (i.e., u 000 > 0). It then follows that c (F 1 ; K 0 ) > c (F 0 ; K 0 ), since u 0 is a strictly decreasing function.
To prove that E b T e jF 1 ; K 1 < E b T e jF 1 ; K 0 , note that 
since u 0 is a strictly decreasing function (i.e., u 00 < 0). Noting that E b T e jF; K = c (F; K)
a j E y t j jF; K , for (F; K) = (F 1 ; K 0 ) ; (F 1 ; K 1 ), equation (27) 
